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Abstract: Since 1996, when Korea's retail industry was liberalised, new store formats 
such as large discount stores, grew, it was widely believed, at the expense of 
incumbent rivals such as traditional markets and small operators. This paper seeks to 
empirically test this proposition: an important underpinning to new regulatory control 
policies. Research involved a spatial analysis of traditional markets (1,456), large 
discount stores (408), and SSMs (super-supermarkets or hypermarkets (729)) spread 
throughout the country, in order to examine the scale and scope of the influence of the 
new retail store formats. The research is supportive of the ‘Traditional Commercial 
Activity Protection Zones’, which protect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
From the perspective of traditional markets, it may be necessary for the South Korean 
government to promote additional, more proactive, support policies for SMEs. 
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1.  South Korean retail change: our approach. 
The case of South Korea commands interest for several reasons. If our interest lay 
purely with globalisation then the rapid rise of South Korea, in barely half a century, 
to become one of the world’s great exporters of products including automobiles 
(Hyundai, Kia etc) and consumer electronics (dominantly Samsung) would demand 
inclusion. Our more modest concerns, however, relate to the domestic implications for 
South Korea of inward retail investment since liberalisation in 1996. Note that 
Dawson (2007 p 373) explicitly bemoaned “the absence, in international retailing, of 
concept and theory that does not hang on the coat-tails of international production” 
before going on to theorise the problem and offering (2007 p393) four dimensions of 
change. (see also Dawson 2003, Dawson and Mukoyama. 2006). The changes that we 
consider could be theorised as part of the diffusion of retail innovations literature (for 
example, Kaynak, 1985). Equally, literature on global retail capital and 
financialisation  would provide a suitable underpinning – as would literature on trade 
regulation since the political economy of world trade is a topic to fascinate. Together, 
the demands that trade be more overtly two-way and  also the Asian financial crisis 
served to prise open certain Asian retail markets (Reardon et al 2003, Reardon et al  
2007). As Wrigley and Lowe (2010) have noted, such trends can explicitly be linked 
to the activities of specific transnational retail firms (see also Coe and Wrigley (eds) 
2009). In a useful summary of globalisation trends they cite South Korea as one of 
four emerging markets entered by UK retailer Tesco. Again, however, our concern lies 
less with the process of inward retail investment than it does with how a host nation 
may react. Two further approaches thus suggest themselves. There is, firstly, the 
regulatory role of the state. Indeed, Dawson (2007) alluded to this by questioning if 
policy makers should seek to devise policies that would provide time for local 
retailers to adjust to new competitive conditions. Such policies need not explicitly be 
linked to inward retail competition as Burt’s (1984) work on the Loi Royer in France 
demonstrated. Tesco’s ‘home’ country has not hesitated to regulate the activities of 
domestic and other retailers in the past (Hallsworth 1998) and a 1996 regulation – the 
sequential test which covers large stores - remains in force. This suggests an ongoing 
role for ‘real regulation’: government-driven legislation. Our second particular 
interest lies with the extent to which the host country is amenable, or otherwise, to the 
presence of newcomers. Though the late Arieh Goldman wrote extensively on Asian 
retail topics (see, for example, Goldman 2001), we especially draw attention to a 1999 
paper by Goldman et al.  Goldman was interested in how the ‘wet markets’ of Hong 
Kong might be so distinctive as to defy attempts by new rivals to lure away their 
customers. As will be seen below, others have commented on the loyalty of South 
Koreans to their traditional markets. This reinforces the view that barriers to entry 
need not be regulatory – though they often are (Wrigley and Lowe 2010 pp 22-24). 
For us then, the fact of market entry into South Korea by global retail giants is a 
given. Our focus is on regulatory responses aimed at ameliorating the effects of these 
changes on existing, traditional retail systems.  That said, much useful information 
does exist as a result of research on the inward investors themselves. Consideration of 
such findings leads us to endorse the work of those who stress the importance of 
territorial embeddedness. Indeed, without such strategies, there might be little by way 
of successful inward retail investment to concern the host nations. 
In focusing on regulation we parallel Kim D-R (2011 p1038) who noted ‘the 
devolution in 1995 of environmental enforcement in South Korea’ before commenting 
(2011 p 1050) that outcomes are ’contingent upon the broader politicoeconomic 
context’. We agree entirely and would add a further coda, introduced by Wortmann 
(2004). This is that, whilst jurisdictions almost never protect individual local 
enterprises per se from new ‘efficient’ competition - unless the latter behave unfairly 
or anti-competitively - they do seek to preserve whole entrepreneurial sectors such as 
SMEs. Understandably so: SME activity underpins large corporations across the 
globe: often working closely with them. Wortman demonstrated that the policy in 
Germany did not discriminate between defending the value offered by industrial 
SMEs and by retail SME’s. In Korean retailing, the change that drives the need for 
regulation has, on our time-frame, been provided by three transnational retailers from 
Europe and North America: Tesco, WalMart and Carrefour.  Turning to our second 
theme we find that researchers viewing the topic from the entrants’ perspective - Coe 
and Lee (2006) – have also noted the factor of the inherent receptiveness of the host 
nation. In respect of South Korean consumers, they noted (2006 p 77) ‘The customers’ 
strong nationalistic outlook and sentiments against foreign capital’ and presciently, 
’WalMart and Carrefour are perceived to be poor at responding to local customer’s 
tastes’ (see also Kim and Jin 2001 and Kim R B 2008). They characterised the fact 
that Tesco entered Korea in 1999 (later than WalMart and Carrefour) via a joint 
venture with Samsung as territorial embeddedness and, especially, ‘strategic 
localisation’. In 2012, of these three major international firms, only Tesco remains in 
South Korea. So, major retail TNCs, often with decades of experience in running 
freestanding large format stores in Western Europe and North America (Hallsworth 
and Evers 2002) export competencies, such as global production networks (GPN), IT 
technology and management know-how but may still be at the mercy of local factors. 
Coe and Lee (2006 p 77) wrote of initial low staff morale but local effects work often 
in subtly different ways – not all of which spell success. Two big arenas for such 
expansion are the growing BRIC economies and also the spectacularly deregulated 
former Soviet Bloc countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland. The 
politicoeconomic context – and a lack of strong local incumbents - has led the latter to 
grant the growth in their retail industry to TNCs, whereas our case study, South Korea, 
has seen competition with TNCs lead to a strong fightback by incumbent domestic 
retailers.  
1.1 Real regulation 
Returning to the issue market regulation, we do not have space here to cover the 
plethora of ways by which Governments can regulate retail markets. For example, 
Germany used store size limits and Japan utilised zoning laws to control the 
expansion of allegedly more productive, large-scale discounters (Boylus and 
Guiseppe 2001). Liberalisation, too, can take many forms: including easing of 
regulations on opening hours or relaxation of merger and competition laws. As noted, 
the Korean government liberalised the distribution market in 1996 whereupon a 
number of foreign retailers entered the market bringing in their large format stores. 
Here we focus on the impact on traditional markets rather than on specific  individual 
small shops and find that decline was most prominent among small and medium-sized 
distributors. The number of traditional markets decreased by 11% from 1,695 (KRW 
36 trillion in revenue) to 1,517 (KRW 24 trillion), whilst the number of large discount 
stores sharply increased from 265 (KRW 19.6 trillion in revenue) in 2003 to 442 (33.7 
trillion) in 2010. Not all agree on the scale and nature of decline following policy 
liberalisation nor on whether or not jurisdictions should intervene proactively. 
According to SMBA (2010), however, the Korean government provided financial 
support of USD 19 billion for 777 traditional markets to renovate facilities and 
improve market quality: paralleling practices found in, for example, Catalunya, Spain. 
However, (see also DCLG 2010) sales in traditional markets continue to decrease 
despite governmental support and efforts, whereas the sales of competitors such as 
large discount stores, supermarkets, and SSMs continue to increase. The new wave of 
large discount stores and SSMs in the Korean distribution market has certainly led to 
a general restructuring though there remain other underlying factors. Key among them 
(Kim W 2011) is the Korean government’s development policy which induces 
concentration of population in the Seoul area (see also Kim and Donaldson, 1979, Kim 
and Kim, 2000). This growth acts as a magnet for large-scale retail store formats to 
open in the most populous cities – putting concentrated pressure on incumbent 
traditional markets 1 . The vital SMEs are thus declining in Korea’s distribution 
industry. To examine this phenomenon we offer an empirical case study which shows 
the effect of government-led regulations to restrict retail conglomerates in order to 
safeguard SME retailers. We map the changes in the retail system caused by TNCs 
and revitalized domestic conglomerates and by analyzing the change based on 
population and floor space. This research also examines the effect of ‘last resort’ 
regulation laws established by the Korean government to assist SMEs through 
restrictions on both franchise stores and those stores under the direct management of 
conglomerates. Korean government action to correct market distortions affecting 
retail SMEs has become politically inevitable. As noted, SME activity is universally 
seen as beneficial and according to the OECD (2010), Korea’s self-employment rate is 
currently high at 28.8%. 
We now consider the evidence base on how structural changes among 
different types of distributors (large discount stores, SSMs, and traditional markets) 
influence the competitiveness of Korean retail industry. First, we analyze the spatial 
locations of large discount stores SSMs, and traditional markets using a GIS 
technique. We utilize this to analyze spatial competition among retailers and then seek 
to assess the impact of the so-called SSM regulation laws enacted by the Korean 
government. We then provide policy suggestions through which the Korean 
government might in future efficiently support traditional markets and SMEs. 
 
                                           
1 As of 2010, Korea’s total population is 48.5 million, 23.8 million of which reside in 
Seoul and Incheon. Thus, 50% of the total population lives in the capital area 
(National Statistical Office, 2010).  
2. Emergent markets and the western retail invasion. 
On our time frame – since the early 1990s - transnational retailers such as 
Tesco, Carrefour and WalMart have used merger and acquisition activities to secure 
dominant market positions in developing countries. A notable pull factor was that, in 
the 1990s, personal disposable income in developing countries increased and TNCs 
drove retail restructuring by introducing large discount stores and super-supermarkets 
(SSMs). Such changes occurred in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Latin America, and, 
as noted, Eastern Europe. 














ASIA Central Europe 
South Korea Hungary 
Shinsegae(L) 4.9 5.6 208 CBA(T) 1.6 12.2 3,435 
Tesco(T) 4.3 4.9 363 Tesco(T) 1.6 12.2 209 
Lotte(L) 4.1 4.7 338 COOP 
EURO(T) 
1.2 9.1 5,255 
GS Retail(L) 2.5 2.8 4,780 Spar(Austria)(T) 1.1 8.2 428 
Seven & l(L) 1.4 1.6 3,664 Reál 
Hungária(L) 




2.6 10.4 6,550 COOP 
EURO(T) 
0.9 14.1 2,280 
Tesco(T) 2.3 9.1 773 Tesco(T) 0.8 12.6 100 
SHV Makro(T) 1.3 4.9 48 Schwarz 
Group(T) 
0.8 12.2 190 
Casino(T) 1.2 4.9 100 CBA(T) 0.4 6.9 578 
Central Retail(L) 0.6 2.2 411 Rewe Group(T) 0.4 5.6 106 
Malaysia Czech republic 
Dairy farm(T) 0.8 4.5 476 Schwarz 
Group(T) 
1.7 10.8 321 
Tesco(T) 0.6 3.7 41 Rewe Group(T) 1.7 10.8 536 
AEON(T) 0.5 3.2 44 Ahold(T) 1.2 7.6 279 
As Watson(T) 0.3 2.1 209 Tesco(T) 1.2 7.5 166 
Carrefour(T) 0.3 1.9 108 Metro(T) 0.9 5.8 13 
China  Poland 
China Res 
Enterprise(L) 
6.3 1.0 4,440 Jerónimo 
Martins(L) 
3.7 6.8 1,570 
Lianhua(L) 5.4 0.9 5,398 Metro(T) 2.3 4.2 142 
Auchan(T) 3.6 0.6 197 Tesco(T) 2.0 3.8 389 
Wal-Mart(T) 2.8 0.5 317 Schwarz 
Group(T) 
1.8 3.4 497 
Carrefour(T) 2.7 1.9 108 Carrefour(T) 1.5 2.8 361 
    Turkey 
    Migros 
Ticaret(L) 
2.9 6 1,818 
    BIM(T) 2.6 5.4 2,930 
    Carrefour(T) 1.4 3 1,160 
    Metro(T) 0.9 1.8 55 
    Tesco(T) 0.7 1.3 149 
Source: Adapted from Bank of America/Merrill lynch, 10 Sept 2010 
(after: OECD , 2010), TNCs(T), Local Firm(L) 
 
<Table 1> depicts key features of TNCs’ overseas expansion into Asian and 
Eastern European markets. Note that Eastern European markets have become 
dominated by TNCs from Western Europe. In the case of Hungary, TNCs swept the 
top 4 rankings in terms of net profit and market share, whereas in Slovakia and Czech 
Republic, TNCs from Western Europe swept the top 5 rankings. Western European 
TNCs in Southeast Asia took rankings 2 to 4 in Thailand with 18.9% of the market 
share, and, in Malaysia, TNCs claim the top 5 rankings occupying 15.4% of the 
market share. In China, TNCs occupy the rankings from No. 3 to No. 5, but their 
market share is not very large due to the immense scale of the Chinese distribution 
market.  
South Korea makes a noteworthy retail case: the only remaining TNC is 
Tesco, which ranks No. 2 with a market share of 4.9%. and the rest of the top 5 are 
Korean conglomerates. The market share occupied by Korean conglomerates amounts 
to 14.7%, and the number of stores operated by these players is 8,9902. Note that the 
market share of the top 5 is very low compared to the much-more-concentrated UK 
market where Tesco alone holds over 30%. Why then, did TNCs fail to dominate 
Korea? Wal-Mart, Carrefour, and Tesco entered the Korean distribution market when 
the Korean government liberalised in 1996 but, as noted, only Tesco remain because, 
in 2006, Wal-Mart and Carrefour both withdrew from the Korean market. Confirming 
the view of Coe and Lee (2006) on the importance of territorial embeddedness, it 
appears that they entered the Korean market without a thorough prior analysis of 
Korea’s incumbent retail conglomerates, which had strong distribution network, sales 
know-how, and capital. The Korean economy in general developed through public 
companies and conglomerates initiated by government in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 
time the retail TNCs arrived, retail distribution was already dominated by a handful of 
conglomerates, such as Shinsegae, Lotte, LG and Hyundai. As a result, TNCs suffered 
difficulties in finding good new locations and in competing with strong local 
incumbents. Second, some failed to meet the needs of Korean customers but 
                                           
2 7-11 was originally an American company, which was acquired by Lotte Shopping, 
which is a Korean conglomerate, in 1994. 
adamantly stuck to their accustomed strategies. WalMart – who also withdrew from 
Germany – found that their business model failed in Korea due to not understanding, 
nor meeting, local needs. Instead of building a strong alliance with local suppliers in 
Korea, they supplied products through collaboration with pre-established overseas 
suppliers, which resulted in failure to supply products that met the preferences and 
tastes of Korean customers. Carrefour deployed CEOs and executives from France to 
promote sales, but failed to survive in the race with competitors and eventually 
withdrew from the Korean market. Korea’s distribution market remains a peculiar 
space where conglomerates have 70-80% of market power in the overall distribution 
industry which is dominated by department stores and large discount stores. Fears that 
foreign TNCs might dominate the Korean distribution industry post-1996 were 
therefore not realized. Instead, foreign TNC entry into the Korean market incentivised 
local conglomerates to strengthen their own large store formats – and hence market 
power and competitiveness. It is clear that this came at the expense of SMEs. 
 
3. Analysis of the Competitive Landscape of Space among Retail Store Formats 
3.1 Data development 
The importance of location in retail business has been emphasized in many 
studies (Clarke et al., 1997: Simkin et al 1985 Bowlby et al., 1984 Jones and 
Simmons 1987). We next analyze the locational characteristics of traditional markets, 
large discount stores and SSMs. We first collected location-related data based on the 
addresses of retailers via the Small & Medium Business Administration database 
(www.smba.go.kr) for information on traditional markets, and “The Yearbook of 
Retail Industry 2010” for large discount stores and SSMs. We collected location data 
for 1,456 traditional markets, 408 large discount stores, and 729 SSMs. To turn such 
location data into spatial data, we used ArcGis 9.3; we first combined the addresses of 
the retailers with the land registration map (parcel) of the Korea Land Information 
System (KLIS); then we converted the locations of each individual market into points 
based on the midpoint of the record of the land registration. We used the Dasymetric 
Mapping technique suggested by Applebaum (1968) to convert the population 
numbers of eup(town), myeon(township), dong(neighborhood) into spatial data by 
rasterization. The 2009 Land Cover Map (LCM), provided by the Korean Ministry of 
Environment, was used to obtain the data. Utilising Choi et al’s., (2010) method, 
populations at the raster cell level are estimated using the following equation: 
    
where  denotes population estimates of the raster cell ,  denotes a locally 
weighted value for tract , which denotes the eup (town), myeon (township), and dong 
(neighborhood) that the raster cell  belongs to, and  denotes estimated population 
coefficient for the land use which is denoted as . As for ,  equals 1 if the land use 
of the raster cell  is , whereas  equals 0 in all other cases. Also, the locally 
weighted factor ( ) is a controlling coefficient to ascertain that the total population 
counts of all raster cells belonging to tract , which denotes the eup (town), myeon 
(township), or dong (neighborhood) coincides with the original population count of 
tract . It can be derived using the following equation:  
   
where  denotes the regression equation estimate of the ordinary least square of 
population on the area of land use ( ) from the land use situation map. The scope of 
land use was determined by utilizing only residential areas among types of land use. 
The size of the raster cell depends on the spatial resolution of the land use situation 
map, but in this study, it was determined as 20m×20m. A regression analysis after 
eliminating the x-intercept presented an estimate of 0.0182 and r-square of 0.25 at a 
significance level of 0.01%. 
 
3.2 Process and contents for Analysis  
Data on traditional markets, large discount stores, and SSMs are built using a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) of the sort used in retailing since the 1980s 
(Goodchild, 1991). A population density map for the analysis of spatial competition 
between businesses is made using the advantages (speed, the comprehensive range of 
data available, quality controls, and data continuity) of the GIS suggested by Clarke 
and Rowley (1995). Next, the location characteristics of the different types of retailers 
are examined by time  period; then, we analyze the locations of large discount stores 
and SSMs in the new Traditional Commercial Activity Protection Zones3. Based on 
this, an analysis of regions where SSMs are additionally permitted to locate is 
conducted. In order to analyze spatial competition between traditional markets and 
large discount stores and the spatial competition between traditional markets and 
SSMs, the business districts are first analyzed by type of retailers. Therefore, we set a 
distance of 800 m between traditional markets and SSMs and 3 km between 
traditional markets and large discount stores, using the business district radiuses 
presented in the Ecology Environment City Manual of The Korea Land & Housing 
Corporation. 
                                           
3 The Korean government amended the Distribution Industry Development Act on 
Nov 24, 2010, and designated traditional market preservation zones to protect and 
preserve the tradition and history of the local distribution industry. According to the 
law, a superstore is not allowed to locate within a distance of 500 m from a traditional 
market or retail store, pursuant to the Special Act for Promotion of Traditional 
Markets and Retail Stores (Article 13-3 of the Distribution Industry Development Act 
of Korea). 
 
3.3 Analysis of spatial location characteristics by types of retailers 
As noted elsewhere, Zhu and Singh (2009), large discount stores and SSMs in 
Korea are located in the most convenient and accessible areas whilst Figure 1 shows 
that traditional markets are more evenly distributed nationally. This is because, 
historically, traditional markets took conventional locations at the center of any 
commercial or cultural area. Overall, in Korea, 98.8% of large discount stores and 
97.1% of SSMs are located in cities. In particular, large discount stores are evenly 
distributed without distinction between the original center and sub center of the city in 
Korea. This implies that most large discount stores are city-centered. On the other 
hand, most traditional markets are shown to be located in big cities with a high 
population density. The data show that 79.3% of traditional markets are located in 
cities. Therefore, it is highly likely that the traditional markets located in cities will 
decline rapidly in the face of new competition. 
Figure 1. Location by type of retailer 
Locations of large discount stores and SSMs by time period 
Large discount stores and SSMs that are in competition with traditional 
markets have increased in number over the last 15 years (1995~2009). There were 
only 13 large discount stores in 1995, but the number had grown to 375 stores in 
2009. During the same period, their sales area grew rapidly from 109,923㎡  to 
3,072,607㎡. After the mid-2000s, the number of large discount stores increased more 
slowly because there were not many regions left with the requisite population to 
support large discount stores. The increase in the number of SSMs is not as high as 
the increase in the number of large discount stores, but the speed of their growth is 
remarkable. In 1995, there were only 46 SSMs, but this number increased to 675 by 
2009. During the same period, the area of sales increased from 45,132㎡ to 565,963㎡
.  SSMs are not increasing their sales area as fast as the number of stores: implying 
that more smaller format stores are now opening. 
Figure 2. Spatial locations of the large discount stores (2000～2009) 
From a wider perspective, there is a similarity in the spatial expansion of 
large discount stores and SSMs. In 2000, most large discount stores and SSMs were 
located in metropolitan areas and in five metropolitan cities. However, since 2005, 
they have been expanding into smaller regions. Between 2005 and 2009, many large 
discount stores and SSMs opened in provincial cities : notably in Gyeonggi province. 
Korea makes a further  interesting contrast with the US experience of WalMart which 
opened its first stores in small and medium-sized cities with populations of 25,000 or 
less and thus adopted a reverse hierarchical strategy with major elements of 
contagious diffusion (Graff and Ashton, 1994,Graff, 1998). Conversely, Korea’s large 
discount stores entered large cities first and then expanded to small and medium-sized 
cities with populations of 100,000 or more: hence following a more typical 
hierarchical diffusion strategy. 
 
Figure 3. Spatial location of SSMs (2000～2009) 
 Area and population-based spatial competition  
By our analysis, the spatial competitive area between the traditional markets 
and the large discount stores is 975 ㎢. This is twice as large as the competitive area 
of 437 ㎢ between the traditional markets and the SSMs. Spatial competition based on 
area is more intense in metropolitan areas, where there are many kinds of retailers. 
The following list of cities, by size order, demonstrates intense spatial competition 
between traditional markets and large discount stores: Seoul (179 ㎢), Busan (152 ㎢
), Daegu (86 ㎢), Incheon (56 ㎢), Daejeon (33 ㎢), Gwangju (30 ㎢), and Ulsan (29 
㎢). The more traditional markets and large discount stores that are located in an area, 
the more intense the spatial competition. However, there is a large deviation in the 
spatial competitive areas of regions that have many traditional markets and large 
discount stores. In order to analyze this interesting phenomenon, we selected regions 
with more than five traditional markets and three large discount stores. The resulting 
order of regions that have low spatial competition between traditional markets and 
large discount stores is as follows: Gumi (4.0 ㎢), Cheon’an (5.2 ㎢), Iksan (5.6 ㎢), 
Suncheon (5.9 ㎢), Paju (6.8 ㎢), Sungnam (7.3 ㎢), Yeosu (8.8 ㎢), and Jeju (10.0 ㎢
). The locations of the large discount stores in these regions do not appear to have 
been decided according to a plan, but at least these large discount stores have less of a 
negative influence on traditional markets than do the large discount stores in other 
regions. Regions that have intense spatial competition between traditional markets and 
SSMs show similar results on the competition between traditional markets and the 
large discount stores, but there are slight differences among these intensely 
competitive regions. The rank order of regions showing intense spatial competition 
between traditional markets and SSMs is as follows: Seoul (108 ㎢), Busan (73 ㎢), 
Daegu (23 ㎢), Daejeon (18 ㎢), Pohang (12 ㎢), Incheon (12 ㎢), Changwon (11 ㎢), 
and Bucheon (11 ㎢). We also conducted an analysis of cities and kun with low spatial 
competition between traditional markets and SSMs and with more than five traditional 
markets and SSMs. The results show that there is very little spatial competition 
between traditional markets and SSMs in cities like Cheon’an (1.4 ㎢), Jeonju (2.0 ㎢
), Jinju (2.1 ㎢), Chuncheon (3.1 ㎢), and Gumi (3.2 ㎢). According to the analysis, 
traditional markets located in these cities are less negatively influenced by the 
locations of SSMs. 
 
Population-based analysis 
We have analyzed the spatial competition between traditional markets and 
large discount stores and that between traditional markets and SSMs, based on 
population. The results of our analysis are as follows: the population of regions with 
spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores and between 
traditional markets and SSMs is 16,610,000 and 8,810,000, respectively. Based on 
population, the spatial competition between the traditional markets and the large 
discount stores is found to have intensified to nearly double that between the 
traditional markets and SSMs. This is because the business districts of large discount 
stores are much larger than those of SSMs. Cities show strong characteristics in 
spatial competition based on population. Intense spatial competition between 
traditional markets and large discount stores is shown in the following regions, 
according to population (provided in brackets): Seoul (4,900,000), Busan (2,530,000), 
Daegu (1,380,000), Incheon (1,300,000), Bucheon (590,000), and Daejeon (500,000). 
As with spatial competition based on area, we analyzed the regions that show the 
weakest spatial competition between traditional markets and large discount stores, 
based on population. For this analysis, we selected regions with more than five 
traditional markets and three large discount stores. From our results, the order of 
regions with the weakest spatial competition between traditional markets and large 
discount stores, based on population (provided in brackets) is as follows: Paju 
(44,000), Pyeongtaek (45,000), Gumi (46,000), Chuncheon (47,000), and Suncheon 
(50,000). In these regions, traditional markets are not seriously influenced by large 
discount stores. Accordingly, spatial competition between traditional markets and 
SSMs, based on population, is similar to the spatial competition between traditional 
markets and large discount stores. Again, this is because most large discount stores 
and SSMs are located in big cities. 
Figure 4 Spatial Competition Population among the Traditional Market, Large 
Discount Stores, and SSMs 
Figure 5 Spatial Competition Region among the Traditional Market and Large 
Discount Stores, and SSMs 
 
4. Measurement of Effect of SSM Regulation Law  
4.1 Purpose of Analysis: effective real regulation. 
Through an amendment to the existing ‘Distribution Industry Development 
Law’ of  2011, policy has been enacted to protect traditional markets through the 
establishment of Conventional Commerce Preservation Districts (CCPDs) regulating 
the location of large retail formats within a 1km radius from the boundaries of 
traditional markets (http://smba.co.kr). It is a fully-fledged location management 
policy to preserve traditional markets. The establishment of these CCPDs has directly 
influenced the growth of SSMs. Essentially, a social consensus existed that the rapid 
growth of large format retailing was causing decline in traditional markets and so 
preservation districts were introduced. We next examine the status of large discount 
stores and the SSMs located in CCPDs. This illustrates potential limitations and 
difficulties faced by location policies that seek to preserve traditional markets. 
Furthermore, we will utilise our spatial analysis to suggest possible permitted 
locations for new SSMs. This carries some parallels with the UK’s so-called 
sequential test (Baldock 2000) and underlines the necessity to monitor the location of 
SSMs which may compete with traditional markets. From the perspective of spatial 
planning, by premptively analyzing the regions where new stores might locate, a more 
effective location policy can be implemented. Analyzing the possible locations for 
new SSMs is a suitable procedure to help preserve traditional markets.  
 
4.2 Location Status of Large Retail Stores and SSMs in CCPDs  
As mentioned above, for the purpose of preservation of traditional markets, 
through the amendment of ‘The Distribution Industry Development Law’ in 2010, the 
opening of large scale stores within a 500m radius from traditional markets was  
limited for the following 3 years. Also, in 2011, the CCPD area was expanded from 
500m to 1km. Based on the same law, there is a necessity to measure what effects the 
regulations covering 500m and 1km actually have. Our approach is to analyze CCPDs 
of 500m and 1km using the GIS to execute a Buffer Analysis. Inevitably this shows 
that regions with more traditional markets have more CCPDs and are especially 
concentrated on the Seoul Metropolitan Region plus the 6 metropolitan cities and the 
large cities in the regional areas. When examining the conventional commerce 
preservation district (500m) based on the spatial size of each city, the findings are as 
follows. They were, in order, Seoul City (9,317㎡), Busan City (6,980㎡), Daegu City 
(5,549㎡), Incheon City (2,741㎡), Ulsan City (1,985㎡), Gwangju City (1,469㎡), 
and Daejeon City (1,322㎡). On June 30, 2011, the government expanded the district 
from 500m to 1km because it was felt that CCPds of 500m did not offer enough 
protection for traditional markets. Using the GIS, our research analyzed the spatial 
size of the area included in the CCPD with the radius expanded from 500m to 1km. 
The resulting ranking was: Seoul City (25,011㎡), Busan City (17,330㎡), Daegu City 
(12,904㎡), Incheon City (7,833㎡), Ulsan City (6,159㎡), Gwangju City (2,765㎡), 
and Daejeon City (4,018㎡), and showed a general increased ratio of 2~3 times.. 
When the CCPD is set at a radius of 1km, the total area with traditional markets at 
their centres covered a net spatial size of 2,490㎢. It showed an increased rate of 3 
times (1,714㎢) compared to when it was 500m (776㎢). In the case of Seoul City and 
the 6 metropolitan cities the total size was 824㎢, showing a 495㎢ increase compared 
to the 500m radius (328㎢), showing the effects of a threefold increase. The number 
of large retail stores in the CCPD is 79, which is 19.4% of the total of 408. Based on 
major cities, there were large retail stores located in the CCPDs in 30 regions: in order 
-  Busan City (19), Seoul City (15) Daegu City (7), and Ulsan City (5). The number of 
SSMs in CCPDs was 213, which is 29.2% of the total number of stores (729). Based 
on these results, it can be confirmed that the location management policies for SSMs 
which are in competing relations with traditional markets were insufficient. SSMs 
were located in the CCPDs in 56 regions in total, and the number of SSMs was larger 
in the major cities: likewise the number of large retail stores. Again in order : Seoul 
City (57), Busan City (38), Daegu City (12), Daejeon City (9) and Changwon City 
and Pohang City (8). The ratio of SSMs located in the CCPDs compared to the total 
number of SSMs showed a large deviation depending on the regions, similar to the 
large retail stores. Although the number of SSMs was only one or two, the number of 
cities where SSMs are located in the CCPDs was found to be 13. The regions are 
Youngcheon City, Cheolwon Gun, Moongyeong City, Hwasoon Gun, Ye-san Gun, 
Changnyoung Gun, Cheong-do Gun, Yeoncheon Gun, Hwoengseong Gun, Jincheon 
Gun, Hongcheon Gun, Yang-gu Gun, and Jeungpyeong Gun. The subsequent regions 
with a high ratio of SSMs in CCPDs were Changwon City (72.7%), Pohang City 
(72.7%), Gunpo City (66.7%), Masan City (62.5%), Gyeongju City (69%) and Busan 
City (55.1%).  
Figure 6 SSMs located in CCPDs  
Figure 7 the finalized possible location for SSMs (Nationwide) 
4.3 Possible New Locations for SSMs  
In essence we see that , as in many other countries, policy  has been enacted 
in response to change that has already taken place. Inevitably, early stores are 
developed in locations that may later prove to be overly impactful. A more proactive 
approach – involving a prior search for sites that will be approved - is surely superior. 
An analysis of such possible new locations for SSMs is now executed: through 5 
major phases. In Phase I, the population within an 800m radius which is the 
commercial domain of SSMs is spatially calculated on a nationwide basis. Inevitably, 
retail store formats tend to locate where a certain level of population can be found. 
The population necessary to support a SSM was analyzed based on the commercial 
area (800m). After setting the national territory in pixels of 20×20m squares, the 
population within an 800m radius was calculated for each pixel. For the analysis, the 
Focal Statistics Tool in the ArcGis 9.3 was used. Predictably, the population of areas 
which can be called the commercial domains of SSMs were higher in major cities 
which are densely populated areas. In Phase II, the potential possible locations of 
SSMs are analyzed.  
Figure 8 The finalized possible location for SSMs (Seoul) 
In 2010, the average population an SSM served was 24,092, and the number 
of areas with a larger population than this was extracted, revealing that the potential 
locations of SSMs were concentrated in Seoul City and the 5 metropolitan cities. The 
major cities in Gyeonggi Province, Cheongju City, and Jeonju City also showed more 
potential as possible locations for SSMs than other regions. In Phase III, the existing 
commercial domain of SSMs is extracted. This is because a new SSM is less likely to 
locate where a rival already exists and so such areas were excluded. We re-utilized 
results on the commercial domain of SSMs as previously generated. In Phase IV, the 
CCPD locations are extracted since, from 2011, SSMs are prohibited to locate nearby. 
Again, we could re-use previously generated data on CCPDs and assess the extent of 
the increased area of SSM prohibition that results from increasing the CCPDs from a 
500m radius to a 1km radius. Broadly, permissible areas will decrease by half (49%) 
from when the CCPD was set at 500m (970,711 ㎡) In the case of Seoul City and the 
6 metropolitan cities, only a spatial area of 271,806 ㎡ will allow the opening of 
SSMs, which will show a decrease of more than half (58%) over the position 
controlled by a 500m radius. A large effect is expected in areas other than Seoul City 
and the 6 metropolitan cities where the advancement of large retail stores and SSMs is 
at a lower level.  
 <Table 2> Comparison of difference in possible locations for SSMs depending on 
alternatives of conventional commerce preservation districts 
(Unit :㎡) 
Name of Region 
Comparison of difference in possible locations for SSMs depending on 
alternatives of conventional commerce preservation districts Within 500m Within 1 km 
Seoul City 247,721 114,428 
Busan City 72,284 10,977 
Daegu City 68,877 22,670 
Incheon City 119,143 51,186 
Gwangju City 52,257 30,234 
Daejeon City 50,277 32,222 
Ulsan City 32,331 10,089 
Gyeonggi Province 319,158 218,599 
Gangwon Province 8,663 6,201 
North Chungcheong Province 21,807 10,776 
South Chungcheong Province 9,522 4,339 
North Jeolla Province 26,125 16,511 
South Jeolla Province 15,334 11,229 
North Gyeongsang Province 6,583 3,886 
South Gyeongsang Province 25,750 6,332 
Jeju Province 6,500 1,473 
Total 970,711 496,606 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
Traditional markets in Korea were believed to encounter difficulties because 
large discount stores and SSMs had expanded their businesses. In order to revive the 
SME economy, the Korean government now provides tangible and intangible support 
for declining traditional markets, which are mostly occupied by small business 
owners. Using a GIS we investigated locational effects of competition among the key 
players—large discount stores, SSMs, and traditional markets—on the distribution 
market. Also, we studied the likely positive legislative effects of CCPDs as a protector 
of retail SMEs (considered as social minorities). Note that, Kompil and Celik (2006), 
when analyzing the restructuring process of the food retailing in Izmir, Turkey, 
pointed out that the foremost agent of retail change was the supermarket. Accordingly, 
Kompil and Celik (2006) claimed that the increase of supermarkets had a huge 
influence on the existing retail pattern and the traditional retail structure. However, 
our results contrast somewhat with Izmir because we found that, in Korea, spatial 
competition between traditional markets and large discount stores is much more 
intense than that between traditional markets and SSMs. We confirmed that the store 
format with the greatest impact on traditional markets and their SME traders is the 
large discount store rather than the supermarket. Importantly, too,  rivalry is keenest 
from re-energised local incumbents rather than strictly from TNCs - meaning that 
protective legislation was not inherently pro-local. When investigating spatial 
competition between large discount stores and SSMs, we examined the 500 m zones 
and found that 79 large discount stores (of 408 retailers, 19.4%) and 213 SSMs (of 
729 retailers, 29.2%) were actually located within traditional market preservation 
zones. This would seem to point to a failure of implementation in respect of the 
location management policy of large discount stores and SSMs. Therefore, aspects of 
previous governmental policy on improving the competitiveness of small business 
owners in traditional markets have been unsuccessful. We suggest that proactive 
policies - by central and local governments - to better regulate large retail stores are 
necessary. In March 2012, Seoul City set regulations so that it can limit the operation 
hours of large retail stores and SSMs (from 12:00 am to 8:00 am) and to mandate 
closing days to twice a month, and advised legislation to the affiliated ‘Gu’s. So, 
regulations on large enterprises such as large discount stores can have real effects. 
Arguably, many of the regulatory laws which were legislated in developed countries 
in the 1980s and the 1990s have declined recently: sometimes with lobbying from 
transnational retailers (Sparks 2008). In some developed countries, local governments 
still use regulatory laws, but fewer developed countries see their central government 
driving forward regulations on large distribution enterprises. In Korea, however, we 
find that the latest regulatory laws on large distribution enterprises led by the central 
government can be effective.  However, a more robust long-term agenda for 
government may be to seek to improve competitiveness of retail SMEs rather than to 
over-regulate large discount stores or SSMs. In the case of Seoul City, because there 
are many government agencies and large enterprises in the city, it may be preferable 
in the long run to introduce Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) as in New York, 
USA and elsewhere. Although many local governments nationwide are holding 
various events and festivals with the central government funding, these projects are 
short-term and unsustainable. Overall, to maximize effective governmental policy 
support, SME retail  business owners need both middle and long term systematic and 
scientific support. Recall that the pressures were initially thought to come from 
market entry by TNCs and their large format stores. In 2012, back in one of the source 
areas for such stores – Europe - Carrefour lost its European market dominance to 
Schwartz group: dominantly a small format operation. 
 
These results have several political implications. First, the intense spatial 
competition among traditional markets, large discount stores, and SSMs directly 
influences the decline of traditional markets. From the perspective of revitalization, 
the prior inability of government to control locations of large discount stores and 
SSMs has simply accelerated the decline of traditional markets. Traditional markets 
are directly influenced by the co-location choices of their competitors. In order to 
secure long-term survival of traditional markets, the government should maintain 
regulation on the locations of retailers that are in competition with them but also offer 
a reasonable selection of locations for SSMs. The government must manage this 
policy strategically. Second, we found that the competition between traditional 
markets and large discount stores has a stronger influence in traditional markets than 
does the competition between traditional markets and SSMs. This can be seen as a 
natural result of the agglomeration economics of large discount stores. From the 
aspect of revitalization of the traditional markets, however, a policy that can ease the 
intense competition between traditional markets and large discount stores is urgently 
required. For example, for areas in which large discount stores are located, 
collaboration between the large discount stores and traditional markets can be a win-
win solution to easing the competition. Therefore, the government should establish 
win-win measures for traditional markets and their competitors. We accept, of course, 
that there are many factors which may cause retail SMEs to fail. If more variables 
such as the internet, home shopping, convenience stores, etc. were to be used as 
dummy variables in spatial competition analysis, a more precise result might be 
obtained. Future research should seek to execute spatial analysis whilst considering all 







This research is a revision, with supplements, of the content of “An analysis of Spatial 
competitions among traditional market, SSMs, and large discount stores and policy measures” 
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